in Paris. The report painted a fairly dire picture of the global climate predicament and made very firm statements regarding the need to reduce global emissions of carbon dioxide. Not surprisingly, it prompted a flood of responses from political leaders around the globe. Perhaps nowhere was this more apparent than in Australia, which (under the incumbent conservative Liberal-National Party coalition government) had remained one of only two developed nations (along with the USA) not to have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Australia also holds the less than illustrious title of having one of the largest per capita carbon emissions of any nation world-wide (Baumert, Herzog & Pershing, 2005) . The release of the IPCC report also coincided with the first sitting week for the year of the Australian Federal Parliament. This timing gained further significance by virtue of the fact that the incumbent government was required, by constitutional regulations, to call a Federal Election at some point prior to the completion of the 2007 calendar year.
A representative national poll 1 conducted for The Australian Newspaper shortly after the release of the IPCC report indicated that 76% of respondents believed that 'climate change is a major problem'. The apparent sudden surge in public interest and concern around the issue was seized upon by the opposition Australian Labor Party (ALP), who, under the relatively new leadership of Kevin Rudd, quickly adopted 'action on climate change' as one of its key policy platforms in the quest to win office. The 24 th of November election would eventually be easily 1 Newspoll, 21 Feb. 2007 , available online at http://www.newspoll.com.au 4 won by the Labor party who, after spending 12 years in opposition, recorded major swings in their favour across most parts of the nation (Williams, 2008) . Exit polling conducted for The Climate Institute by the Australian Research Group in marginal seats around the nation showed that, of voters who gave their first preference to Labor, 70 percent indicated climate change to be an area on which they believed that the two parties could be 'distinguished' from one another (second only to industrial relations at 83 percent). Furthermore, when all polled voters were asked whether they thought either of the two major parties was better at handling climate change, 41 per cent chose the ALP and only 16 per cent the former government (Milne, 2007) . Such opinion poll and exit poll data may at first glance suggest a relatively straight forward reading of the social psychological status of 'climate change action' in the public consciousness in Australia during the period in question. However, as much social psychological work from the discursive vein has pointed out (e.g., Potter & Wetherell, 1995) , a potential theoretical limitation of such data is that there is an assumption made that the attitude object in question (e.g., 'climate change action') represents a consensually agreed upon object of thought. What is often ignored in the interpretation of such data is the extent to which the meaning of the very attitude objects in question can be constructed in a multiplicity of ways in everyday talk, often even within a single speaker's account. Condor, Gibson & Abell's (2006) recent work in the area of English/British identity provides a perfect case in point. These authors highlight the extent to which national surveys asking respondents to indicate the extent to which they identify as "British" and/or 'English" have typically been interpreted in ways that belie the far more complex and nuanced fashion in which such terms are deployed in everyday talk amongst various sections of the community. In relation to the present context, therefore, whilst exit polls may have suggested that respondents voted for Labor due to a cognitive representation of Labor being more willing to take action on climate change, it is important to interrogate, discursively, the ways in which Labor (and their opponents) actually constructed the attitude object/s in question in their political rhetoric.
The socially constitutive nature of talk and text relating to environmental/ecological issues has been highlighted by a range of authors across a range of disciplines, including sociology, linguistics and discursive/rhetorical social psychology (see Macnaghten & Urry (1998) , Harré, Brockmeier & Mühlhäusler (1999) and Aiello & Bonaiuto (2003) , respectively, for reviews). More specifically, there is a large body of literature that has investigated the ways in which the issue of climate change (previously known as 'global warming' or 'the greenhouse effect') is represented within public discourse (e.g., Bell, 1994; Henderson-Sellers, 1998; Mormont & Dasnoy, 1995; Wilkins, 1993; Wilson, 1995; Zehr, 2000) . The majority of these studies, particularly in more recent years, have tended to focus on analyses of media representations. Areas of investigation have included analyses of the ways in which constructions of uncertainty, scientific controversy and climate scepticism have proliferated through the media as a function of journalistic professional standards premised on the requirement for 'balanced reporting' (Antilla, 2005 conflict with attempts to be seen as acting in the 'national interest' and, secondly, the extent to which addressing issues of resource consumption associated with environmental risk can be set up as in opposition to the modern liberal principles of economic progress and free-reign consumerism (Bulkeley, 2001) . Both issues seem highly significant, given that 'acting in the national interest' and 'allowing free citizens to consume' arguably represent two ubiquitous rhetorical arguments in political debates in modern western societies.
Secondly, there is no doubt that climate change is becoming an increasingly important international issue, one that is attracting considerable attention from both governments worldwide and the general public. As social psychologists we are also interested in the ways in which social identities around climate change are becoming increasingly salient concerns and, more particularly, morally accountable matters. The contested and highly politicised debates around climate change have generated a range of social, political, and moral identities around this issue, which are being routinely mobilized and invoked in particular ways to warrant, challenge and or undermine the varied positions taken on this issue. As such, one of our aims in this paper is to demonstrate how these emergent social identities around climate change are rhetorically organised and strategically managed in political rhetoric and argument.
The 'national interest'
As Billig (1995) argues, the notion of 'nationhood' has acquired a commonsense takenfor-granted status that informs not only political discourse but everyday sense-making practices.
Appeals to the 'national interest' are therefore ubiquitous in political discourse, not only in matters pertaining to foreign policy, where the discourse of national interest is most prevalent, but increasingly also in domestic policy debates. Despite its slippery nature, it is at the same time a powerful rhetorical resource commonly mobilised in political discourse to prescribe, justify, and invoke public support for particular policy positions (Billig, 1995; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001 ). Thus, precisely what constitutes a nation's 'interests' is a highly contestable matter.
Indeed, Reicher and Hopkins (2001) have demonstrated the discursive utility of 'national interest' talk in political rhetoric and its ubiquitous use by parties across the entire political spectrum to mobilise public support for contrasting policies and agendas. Dickerson's (1998) discursive analysis of 'national interest' talk in televised political discourse, for example, found that the 'national interest' was a rhetorical resource that was drawn upon by politicians to accomplish two main functions: (1) to construct social realities that forward particular ideological agendas, and (2) to attend to local interactional concerns such as exoneration and blaming. The 'national interest' then, becomes a useful resource when discussing the intentions behind either one's own or others' political actions and, at the same time, for constructing and prescribing political 'reality'.
A specific and detailed example of this kind of rhetorical positioning can also be found in Wallwork and Dixon's (2003) Another key element of the politics of environmental policy (including climate change), however, is the political and institutional relationship between the nation state and the individual citizen. It is to this issue that our discussion now turns.
Ecological Modernisation and Lifestyle Maintenance
Previous authors have examined the ways in which the environmental problematic has often lead to a discursive construction of such issues as being ameliorable through technical solutions, without recourse to reform of existing social, political or economic institutions (Hajer, 1995) . Such discourses of purely economistic (or 'weak') ecological modernization have been seen as a useful strategy in managing ecological dissent in such a way that distances such modernist discourses from the more interventionist remedies of the 1970s. This is arguably achieved by constructing environmental protection as compatible with unbridled economic growth and the associated growth in high-consumption lifestyles (Christoff, 1996) . For example, Lovell's (2004) given the drastic cuts to world greenhouse gas emissions proscribed by the IPCC (25-40% by 2020; 80% by 2050), it is also of interest to investigate the ways in which politicians navigated the politically contentious issues implicated in dealing with proposed changes that would perhaps be difficult to easily subsume under discourses of (weak) ecological modernisation. As highlighted above, an examination of the attendance to the national interest and lifestyle maintenance within national political rhetoric is also likely to bring into focus the ways in which constructions of national identity are implicated in such maneuvers.
The Present Study
The current paper analyzes political rhetoric around climate change that was produced by the major Australian political parties following the release of the IPCC report (February 2007) in the lead up to the Federal Election in November of that same year. As such, the data for the project are 'naturally occurring' (Potter, 2002) qualitative data that were collected from various broadcast and online media during the period in question. The corpus of data consists of public speeches, television and radio media interviews, official political party media releases, as well as
Hansard transcripts of debates in both the houses of the Australian Parliament. The analysis is informed primarily by the principles of discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1987 (Billig, , 1991 Weltman & Billig, 2001 ) and focuses on the various ways in which the issue of climate change was invoked and rhetorically managed by each of the two major parties in the lead up to the election. where audio recordings were available, these have been transcribed using Jefferson's (1984) transcription system. Whilst our particular analytic focus adopted in the present paper does not focus greatly on these more fine-grained para-linguistic particulars, we have included this notation for the benefit of readers who may wish to interrogate the extracts at this particular level.
Method of Analysis
The approach to analysis draws upon the principles of both discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and rhetorical psychology (Billig, 1987 (Billig, , 1991 Weltman & Billig, 2001 ). Both of these approaches have as their focus the ways in which discourse and rhetoric actively construct particular versions of social reality, which in turn, accomplish particular social and interactional objectives such as explaining, justifying, blaming, accusing, and so on (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Hepburn, 2000; Potter, 1996; . Specifically, the current study is concerned with identifying the particular discursive practices and rhetorical strategies used by both major parties in formal and informal political talk about the 'problem' of (and 'solutions' to) climate change. Our analysis focuses on examining the constructions made available by these ways of talking, and the implications of such constructions. For example, we are interested in how the deployment of various constructions worked to achieve particular ends, both in the situated interactional context of parliamentary debate and political interviews, but also at a broader level of shared cultural resources that are drawn upon to make sense of climate change as an increasingly salient global issue. Although these approaches to analyzing discourse -the local interactional and the broader cultural -have sometimes been treated as oppositional (Billig, 1999; Schegloff, 1997; , we aim to adopt a synthetic approach to analysis as advocated by both Wetherell (1998) and Phillips (2000) . By attending to both the practical and local concerns of social interaction as well as broader cultural repertoires of understanding that are being drawn upon to talk, argue and debate the dilemmatic topic of climate change, we hope to advance our understanding of how this issue is being oriented to in public discourse and political rhetoric.
Analysis and Discussion
This analysis centres around an examination of the different ways in which the rhetorical resources (Billig, 1987; Billig et al.,1988) of 'national interest' and 'lifestyle maintenance' were attended to by both sides of the political debate. We argue that the rhetorical positioning of a proposed political party policy as being in line with the 'national interest' or as involving the 'maintenance of lifestyles' was persuasive given the nature of these resources as bottom-line arguments. Building on previous research (e.g., Dickerson, 1998; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001 ), we examine ways in which these resources were constructed and functioned flexibly, constituting the problem of, and solutions to, climate change in various ways.
Contrasting the 'national interest' with 'ideology'
As the Australian political debate around climate change unfolded post the release of the IPCC report, it quickly began to focus in on the issue of the 'national interest'. Indeed, during election campaigns the 'national interest' becomes a ubiquitous rhetorical resource -an end or objective that any party policy must be able to be seen to be pursuing. In relation to climate change policy specifically, potential policies needed to be constructed by party spokespeople in such a way as to manage two potential 'dilemmas' arising from the 'crisis'/'challenge' of climate change, namely, the health of the national economy, and Australia's relative political and economic positioning in a global context.
From the conservative coalition Government side, references to national economic interest were used to undermine Labor's claims that the government should be taking 'drastic and immediate action' to reduce emissions, with such actions constructed by the government's rhetoric as being damaging to Australia's economy. We see evidence of this construction in the Environment Minister, Malcolm Turnbull's, address to Parliament in Extract 1 below:
Extract 1
Turnbull: Wh↑at will the (0.3) the ah: (0.2) the member for Kingsford Smith Thus, calls by the ALP for a heeding of the IPCC's warning and the setting of ambitious emissions reduction targets were constructed as showing a flagrant and irresponsible disregard for the 'national (economic) interest'. We see here, therefore, an example of the way that the 'national interest' can be used as a rhetorical resource in political interaction to question the legitimacy of an opponent's motives (as per Dickerson, 1998) . What is also interesting, however, is the way in which Turnbull works to construct the Labor position as being driven by the pursuit of 'ideology' (l. 17). The use of the category 'ideology' in this context is significant for the connotations it evokes to represent the Labor opposition as adopting an extreme or dogmatic position on climate change, as opposed to a position which is arrived at by an objective appraisal of the facts. Turnbull appeals to the commonplace understanding in liberal democratic societies that the 'national (economic) interest' should not be hi-jacked by policy that is driven by ideology (ll. [16] [17] [18] [19] or by party-political philosophy (l. 22). In this account, the national interest is juxtaposed with ideological interest: whereas the government is represented as protecting the former, the opposition is accused of damaging the collective interest in pursuit of a selfinterested party-political agenda. Thus, taking immediate and drastic steps to reduce emissions (as recommended by a panel of the world's top scientists in the IPCC) was constructed as an inherently 'ideological' policy that would see unsuspecting Australians "sacrificed" in the pursuit of mere 'ideology'.
In addition to questioning the ALP's motives for taking action on climate change, the Initiative. This initiative, in essence, involved investing Australian money in attempts to restructure economic activities in developing countries (especially nearby Indonesia) so as to reduce the amount of old-growth rainforest being cleared in these regions. As Howard argued in a national radio interview:
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Extract 3
Howard: … we should embrace practical immediate measures (0.6) uh such as our 1 initiative on deforestation which will (0.5) uh reduce greenhouse gas 2 emissions but won't do such dramatic damage to the Australian economy. In this extract, Howard positions himself and the government as able to provide strategies to manage both climate change and the economy, constructing the two issues as not incompatible. Thus, the Liberal party were able to retain their commitment to not doing 'drastic damage to the Australian economy' (l. 3), whilst still being seen to be supporting action ('practical immediate measures', l. 1) on climate change through the preservation of offshore carbon sinks. This policy proposal then neatly side-stepped the requirement of Australia to reduce its own carbon emissions (which was implicitly equated with damaging the economy) by shifting the burden of responsibility on to other (developing) nations. Thus the limits to climate change action (which was represented primarily by the government as a global international concern) were prescribed first and foremost by Australia's economic interests. This tension between in-principle support of climate change action and the in-practice limits placed on that action, represents a 'theory/practice' distinction, whereby Howard and the government asserted their commitment to an ideal of climate change action while, at the same time, undermining this ideal through 'practical' measures (Wetherell, Stiven & Potter, 1987) ; measures which effectively privilege the national economy over climate change.
From the ALP's perspective, the rhetorical resource of 'national interest' provided a more complex dilemma to be managed. In a nation whose (heavily unionized) coal industry of over 30,000 employees earns approximately A$24 billion in export revenue, a ALP policy platform of drastically reducing carbon emissions required some degree of rhetorical work in order to 22 address concerns around the 'national interest'. Firstly, in relation to the national economy, Labor constructed the Government's past (and presumed future) lack of action on climate change as 'damaging to the national economic interest'. Thus, while the 'national (economic) interest' is still privileged here, it is reframed to have alternative implications for climate change action.
Labor's Shadow Treasurer, Wayne Swan, weighed into the debate in order to address these potential concerns.
Extract 4
Swan: Climate change goes to the core of our economic prosperity. The Stern a narrow period of 10 or so years, the economic consequences of that put 4 prosperity at risk.
(Doorstop Media Interview, 6th February 2007)
We see in Extract 4 above the way in which Swan counters the Government's construction of immediate and drastic actions to reduce emissions as spelling doom for the Australian economy by invoking the Stern Report 3 as an empirical warrant to, instead, construct inaction on climate change as being the economically irresponsible policy position for the nation, and as being against the 'national (economic) interest' ('the core of our economic prosperity', l. 1). Indeed, the citing of the Stern Report by Swan grounds his claims about economic prosperity in the expert status of a highly-regarded and distinguished economist, someone who has the category entitlement to make such claims (Dickerson, 1997; Potter, 1996) . Thus inaction on climate change was constructed here as an economic issue and not an environmental issue alone.
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We can see this construction again in this extract from the Peter Garrett-Malcolm Turnbull televised debate on climate change, moderated by the ABC TV's Kerry O'Brien.
Extract 5
Garrett: But it's also (.) a very big carbon market that's developing out there Kerry= 
Challenging the 'common sense' of 'national interest'
At this stage of the debate, during the weeks immediately following the release of the IPCC report, one could say that the electorate had been provided with a relatively clear choice between the two parties with regards to climate change policy. The ALP had adopted a relatively 'green', 'immediate action on climate change' policy platform with a strong focus on renewable energy, with the incumbent Government offering a relatively 'conservative', 'don't rush into drastic changes' policy platform. As we have demonstrated, both parties had drawn on the 24 rhetorical resource of the 'national interest' to defend themselves from accusations of stake and interest: that effectively their positions were ideologically or politically driven. Furthermore, both had typically constructed the 'national interest' as being based in the national economy.
However, in the middle of February, the debate was to take a sudden turn. 
(Interview on AM program (ABC Radio National), 9th February 2007)
Of interest in Extract 6 is the extent to which Brown reframes the economic construction of the 'national interest' that typically formed the cornerstone of the two major parties' rhetorical maneuvering around the climate change issue. Indeed, Brown essentially concedes that his proposal would cause some short-term effects that may be perceived as not being in the 'national (economic) interest' ('To suddenly ban coal exports would be massively dislocating', ll.6-7), and also works to preempt the reaction of the two major parties to such a proposal ("this is where politicians will panic", l. 12, emphasis added). Here, Brown labels the likes of Howard and Rudd as 'politicians', an identity label that in this context appears to function to construct his opponents as being somewhat beholden to their 'political' desire to be seen by the public as 
Extract 7
4 Australia uses a preferential ballot voting system in elections, such that all voters must number every box on the ballot paper to indicate their preferences for candidates running for their local 'seat' in parliament. Thus, the 'preferences' of those voting 1 for a minor party often become crucial in determining which of the two major parties wins a particular seat. For a full account of these processes, see http://www.aec.gov.au/Voting/ Howard: As a community as we r-(0.6) debate ways of responding There is no other country in the world like Australia which has such a huge 7 national interest in making sure that we perfect clean coal technology. We've 
(Doorstop Media Interview, 3rd April 2007)
We see here how Brown's reframing of the 'national interest' allowed Rudd to characterize Brown's ideas as irrational ('having rocks in his head'). In this way, Labor was able to reposition themselves, through their focus on (the yet to be developed) 'clean coal technology' as acting in the best interests of the nation. Indeed, Rudd emphasizes the magnitude of Australia's stake and interest in developing this technology, describing it as "huge" (ll. 7-8), and as unique and distinct in international comparative terms (l. 7: "There is no other country in the world like Australia").This position was represented as the sensible middle ground between Brown's proposal to shut down the Coal Industry within 3 years and Howard's (politically unpopular) alternative of a Nuclear agenda (ll. 13-14). Thus, Rudd equates the national interest as residing with an 'action on climate change' policy centred around the development of clean coal technology and, as such, aligns it with the interests of the coal industry itself, Australia's largest export industry.
Thus far, we have demonstrated how both of the major political parties constructed and mobilized the resource of 'national interest', rhetorically, in order to provide a warrant for their policies on climate change. We have also demonstrated the ways in which a challenge to this construction of the 'national interest' and the reframing of this resource on global environmental or social justice grounds was unsuccessful in changing the terms of the debate, highlighting the rhetorical power of defining the 'national interest' in predominantly economic terms.
Importantly, the analysis also demonstrates the increasing political salience of social identities around the issue of climate change and how particular identities were constructed as problematic and morally accountable matters. The government was accused by Labor (and the Greens) of being 'climate change sceptics', the Labor opposition was positioned by the government as 'climate change fanatics', and the Greens were positioned by both major parties as 'dangerous'
and 'deluded'. These contrasting identities around climate change were essentially all represented as being extreme and irrational. Conversely, a'middle', measured approach representing balance, reason and rationality was invariably invoked by both major parties as a political and moral solution to the challenges/crises presented by climate change science.
Moreover, one of the ways in which both major parties attempted to project this measured and balanced identity was to draw on a 'theory/practice' distinction (Wetherell, Stiven & Potter, 1987) in order to represent their policies as being committed to climate change action, while also attending to the practical limitations to such actions which should not risk jeopardizing the 'national (economic) interest'.
Ecological Modernisation and 'Lifestyle Maintenance'
In addition to the repeated mobilising and flexible deployment of the the 'national interest', both parties also demonstrated the need to attend to the issue of 'lifestyle maintenance'.
Despite a recognition of a need to reduce carbon emissions (and 'drastically', in the case of Labor), both parties constructed their 'climate change solutions' as involving, and indeed being centered around, the maintenance, rather than the changing, of people's lifestyles. This pervasive concern around 'maintaining lifestyles' provides a further example of a 'theory/practice' distinction; in this instance, the practical limitations on climate change action were based in the rhetoric of maintaining a modern Australian lifestyle. As will be demonstrated below, the construction of 'lifestyle maintenance' was inter-related with the rhetorical use of 'national interest', with both resources functioning to (re)produce various constructions of the Australian/national 'identity' that typically focused around a modern liberal consumerist identity.
The rhetorical resource of 'lifestyle maintenance' was also borne out in the policy proposals themselves, with each party having what one might call their own 'get-out-of-lifestylechange-free' cards; Clean Coal in Labor's case, and Nuclear Power in the case of the Government (and, one might argue, getting Indonesians to change their lifestyles/livelihoods).
Both were presented as ways of reducing carbon emissions whilst managing to produce enough energy to meet a relatively 'business as usual' national energy demand profile. It is worth noting, however, that both of these 'solutions' (Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), and Nuclear Power)
were (and continue to be) potentially moot points in the short term. The IPCC report offered a fairly clear warning that it was imperative that global emissions are brought under control by 2020, in order to avoid a situation of 'runaway climate change'. Estimates at the time, however, predicted that neither CCS technology nor nuclear power plants could have replaced current/projected base load provided by brown coal power generation in Australia before, at best, about 2019. Also worth noting is that there was little to no focus from either major party on reducing the demand side of the equation; that is, in promoting the simplification or alteration of lifestyles to reduce the actual size of the national base load that needed to be provided (by whatever means). Thus, the ecologically modernist discourse of maintaining current rates of growth in demand for energy (which was what politicians were referring to implicitly when they spoke of 'lifestyles') also became, for both parties, something to which they attended within the climate change debate.
On the Government side, the Nicholas Stern targets outlined earlier were opposed on the very basis of them 'threatening the Australian lifestyle'. This can be seen in the following extract from a national radio interview with Howard with the ABC's Chris Uhlmann:
Extract 9
Howard: .h well we have to be very careful (0.7) in setting targets that we don't do 1 greater damage (0.6) to our economy and our=uh lifestyle than .h will be Howard argues that Stern 'should be listened to' (l. 9), at the same time he constructs his recommendations as 'views' which 'aren't holy writ' (l. 9) and, indeed, defy common sense.
Moreover, Howard further undermines Stern's recommendations by emphasizing the magnitude of damage that they would cause the Australian economy by the extreme-case formulations (ll.
17-19: 'thousands of people out of work'; 'eno:rmous damage to the Australian economy') and contrasts these consequences with his own 'practical' and 'common sense' approach to the issue.
A similar discourse of taken-for-granted growth (or at least maintenance) in energy consumption is seen below in Extract 10 in which Howard builds the case for nuclear power.
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Extract 10
Howard: And and and the (0.5) well I mean the ah (0.7) the ah the ah (0.2) 1 the Opposition ah reacts negatively to that but the truth is that if you We see in Extract 10 how Howard constructs a need to maintain 'a modern economy' (and, thus, 'sustain our standard of living', repeated at ll. 27-28) as the 'common sense minimum of [the] debate ' (ll. 23-24) , that is, a common sense bottom-line argument. Notably, Howard fends off potential accusations of stake and interest on this issue by co-opting the expert views of 'Australia's chief scientist', Dr Jim Peacock, to warrant his arguments that 'you cannot run power stations on renewables ' (ll. 13-14 & ll. 29-30) and that 'you can only run them on fossil fuels or on nuclear power ' (ll. 15-18 & ll. 30-31) . Indeed he disavows that these are his own views (ll. 5-7: '.h and that is the view not of John Howard that's the view of Jim [Peacock] , (see Dickerson, 1997) ).
Whilst conceding that to continue to meet the current (and likely growing) energy demands of the nation by burning fossil fuels is problematic, the solution proposed by Howard is to try to develop ways of burning the same amount of coal whilst sequestering the associated carbon dioxide emissions, or, if this becomes too expensive, to switch to nuclear. Thus, under an ecologically modernist discourse of 'lifestyle maintenance', in which the reconfiguring of lifestyles to drastically reduce demand for energy is beyond the pale, the Labor position of opposing nuclear power and strongly advocating renewables is rendered somewhat of a sitting duck to such bottom-line-arguments as 'you can't run power stations on solar or wind power' (ll.
29-30) 'in a modern economy ' (l. 17 & l. 28 ).
The ALP did occasionally mention the possibility of reducing energy demand, however this was only ever done in the context of discussions about introducing new technologies, such as their Green Car Initiative 6, a Solar Rebate Scheme 7 and the dissemination of Smart Meters, the latter of which was the topic of a doorstop interview from which the following extract is taken.
Extract 11
6 A proposal to establish an industry producing hybrid vehicles in Australia 7 A proposal to increase the government rebate available for households that wish to install solar panel systems of their roof. This proposal was, however, effectively lampooned in the 2008 Budget by virtue of imposing a means test on its availability.
Rudd:
There's another element too which is critical which is what we do and might 1 be described as demand side management -that is personal responsibility. In 2 other words how can we personally bring down our level of electricity 3 consumption, because not only does that save you money, it also helps when 4 it comes to reducing the amount of electricity which needs to be generated 5 36 which in turn pulls out greenhouse gas emissions from the atmosphere. Although Rudd does here invoke the notion of both 'demand … management' (l. 2) and 'personal responsibility' (l. 2), as he himself points out in the extract, these Smart Meters are, in fact, simply a device that provides residents with a greater amount of specific information about their current energy use (ll. 13-17). In addition, they also allow power companies to offer different pricing structures for power consumed at different times of the day, which may encourage residents to try to spread their energy consumption more evenly across the day, which would in turn help reduce the 'peaking' in electricity consumption that makes supplying energy to large cities such an inefficient exercise. This discourse of 'smartness' ("Smart Meters", "a smart way to go") has strong echoes to the 'smart housing' discourse identified by Lovell (2004) that we outlined earlier. In a similar vein to Lovell's observations, however, it is important to note the way in which references to voters 'personally reducing their level of greenhouse gas emissions ' (ll.19-20) was really only ever broached in political party rhetoric in relation to the installation of new 'devices'. Such devices (in the case of Smart Meters) would only actually bring about reductions in CO2 emissions if residents also changed their energy consumption 37 behaviours in response to the information offered by these devices. However, this final caveat was (perhaps unsurprisingly) never the focus of the political debate. Indeed, neither party ever talked about their own climate change policies in relation to either a) increasing energy prices, or b) imposing any kind of regulatory controls on individual consumption practices, a practice that is actually commonplace in almost all major Australian cities with regards to residential water consumption. The lack of mention of price increases is particularly significant given that both parties continually advocated the establishment of a national emissions trading scheme, a policy that could only work if it lead directly to quite large increases in the price of carbon intensive goods and services. Thus rather than emphasizing the need for significant reductions in energy consumption that could only be effected by compromises to existing modern lifestyles, these 'smart' new technologies/devices are represented here as opportunities for consumers to exercise choice in consumption patterns and levels. Thus, we can see how the ALP, in particular, were able to construct 'drastic and immediate action' on climate change as being reconcilable with a maintenance of consumer 'lifestyles', as opposed to requiring drastic or immediate changes in citizens' day-to-day practices or the institutional arrangements that govern them.
Conclusion
As Hepburn (1997) has posited, "to understand a social problem . . . we have to be aware of the discursive limits employed in the way that the problem is constructed" (p.27). Such a suggestion is particularly apt in the case of global climate change. Without doubt, there is a clear need for the world's top scientists to continue their efforts to attempt to monitor, model and predict the current and likely future changes to our climate under various emissions scenarios 38 through bodies such as the IPCC. As our analysis here has demonstrated, however, the ways in which such scientific reports are responded to, at both the political and individual level, is a complex issue that is ripe for social psychological enquiry. Such enquiry should, to our mind, work at multiple levels and should certainly include individual and community-level 'behaviour change' investigations (see Spence, Pidgeon & Uzzell, 2009 ). As we have demonstrated, however, it is also important that social psychologists (and others) examine the discursive limits of the evolving climate change debate. In the contemporary Australian political context, these limits appear to revolve around a need to construct accounts of climate change policy in terms of both the 'national interest' and 'lifestyle maintenance'. Both of the major political parties invoked a fundamentally economic notion of the 'national interest' in order to provide a warrant for their policies on climate change, with attempts by the Greens Party to reframe this so-called 'national interest' in terms of global environmental or social justice concerns being wholly unsuccessful in gaining any political traction. Moreover, both major parties attempted to position themselves as providing a 'practical' approach to the issue, drawing on a 'theory/practice' distinction (Wetherell, Stiven & Potter, 1987) in order to represent their own policies as being committed to climate change action, while also attending to the practical limitations to such actions which should not risk jeopardizing the 'national (economic) interest'.
Furthermore, The ALP were also able to invoke an ecological modernization discourse to construct 'drastic and immediate action' on climate change as being reconcilable with a maintenance, rather than a changing, of consumer 'lifestyles'.
What ties both of these ubiquitous rhetorical resources -national interest and lifestyle maintenance-together, however, is an inherent construction of both national and individual identities in relation to notions of modern, liberal, consumerism. The term 'national interest' was, after all, always situated by the major parties in relation to the national economic interest, precluding, for example, the fashioning of new forms of national interest or identity predicated around concerns for global environmental or intergenerational justice. Likewise, 'lifestyle maintenance' was inherently constructed in binary opposition to a situation in which individual citizens' rights to consume at will might be constrained. There has, to date, been little empirical social psychological work that has explicitly examined individual and collective identities around the modern, industrial, western, liberal high-consuming subject. Such investigations would appear to hold great potential in the context of the current push towards 'sustainability' and the associated focus on the finite nature of the world's resources. As the current analysis has demonstrated, such concepts still appear to be gaining little traction within the mainstream politics of a capitalist economy which is predicated on generating greater demand for production and consumption. In many ways, one could argue that consumerism is the very thing that is at stake in the politics of climate change, and that it is precisely this that makes the notion of drastic reductions in carbon emissions such a rhetorically fraught issue for both sides of politics in many nations around the globe. Consumerist and economic rationalist discourses might, thus, be thought of as culturally pervasive rhetorical resources that impose limitations on political debate around climate change,. However the advantage of the synthetic approach to analysis (Phillips, 2000; Wetherell, 1998) adopted here is that it also allows one to examine the implications of the specific ways in which such culturally pervasive rhetorical resources are deployed by political leaders in such contexts as parliamentary debate and media interrogation. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, such an approach also allows for an examination of both the ways in which climate change policy is formulated to attend to broader,
